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ABSTRACT
We design a protocol for dynamic prioritization of data on
shared routers such as untethered 3G/4G devices. The mech-
anism prioritizes bandwidth in favor of users with the high-
est value, and is incentive compatible, so that users can sim-
ply report their true values for network access. A revenue
pooling mechanism also aligns incentives for sellers, so that
they will choose to use prioritization methods that retain
the incentive properties on the buy-side. In this way, the de-
sign allows for an open architecture. In addition to revenue
pooling, the technical contribution is to identify a class of
stochastic demand models and a prioritization scheme that
provides allocation monotonicity. Simulation results confirm
efficiency gains from dynamic prioritization relative to prior
methods, as well as the effectiveness of revenue pooling.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2 [Computer Communication Networks]: Miscella-
neous;
Keywords
Mechanism design; bandwidth sharing.
1. INTRODUCTION
Many mobile broadband data users overpay for data plans,
buying a data plan with sufficient monthly quota for their
maximum needs even though the average consumption is
only about 15% of the monthly quota [1]. Analysis of cell
phone data has also shown quota dynamics [2] in users, i.e.,
sensitivity to quota balance and time to the end of the quota
period. One way to address these inefficiencies is to allow
surplus bandwidth to be shared. In this paper we propose an
auction-based protocol for such bandwidth-sharing. Sellers
have wireless broadband (3G/4G) devices with a WiFi like
WLAN radio, and can share network access through teth-
ering apps that allow them to act as routers. Buyers have
WiFi devices and pay sellers to relay their data.
Rather than finding optimal static allocations to users,
our focus is on dynamic prioritization of access to band-
width. Dynamic prioritization is more efficient because it
can handle temporal heterogeneity in user demand. We de-
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sign an auction protocol to prioritize network access in fa-
vor of those with highest value. In ensuring simplicity for
users, we seek an incentive compatible design, so that truth-
ful reporting of value and straightforward use of the shared
bandwidth (no delaying of traffic, no padding of traffic) is
optimal for a user. Incentive compatibility is also useful
in avoiding “churn” and system overhead that can occur if
users can benefit by adapting reported values given reports
of others. Similar arguments have been made in the context
of sponsored search markets [7].
Our positive results are stated for users with linear (per-
byte) valuation functions. Give this, incentive compatibility
requires that the cumulative quantity of network resources
consumed by a user is non-decreasing in bid value, a prop-
erty referred to as monotonicity. Our main technical con-
tribution is to establish conditions on user demand models
for which a strict priority-queue approach to resource access
control satisfies monotonicity. An important property satis-
fied by the demand models is that a user’s cumulative con-
sumption of network bandwidth over a user session weakly
increases as a function of her total consumption up to any
intermediate time. An additional technical challenge that
we address is to ensure that users cannot benefit through
delayed use of allocated network resources, or by introduc-
ing fake traffic to increase demand.
Payments are computed by adopting an approach due to
Babaioff, Kleinberg, and Slivkins [4] (bks). This involves
adding an additional, random perturbation to bids.1 In a
typical auction setting, the auctioneer knows how an allo-
cation of resources would have changed given different bids.
This counterfactual information is essential to standard pay-
ment schemes but unavailable here. It would require knowl-
edge of how much bandwidth a user would consume under a
different priority, but this requires knowledge that the net-
work infrastructure does not have about a user’s demand
model. The only information available for the purpose of
determining payments is the actual realization of consump-
tion based on the actual assignment of priority. The intro-
duction of random perturbation by the bks scheme avoids
the need for this counterfactual information.
We also extend our design so that it embraces open net-
work architectures. In particular, we are robust to router
devices that can install alternative routing software, for ex-
ample to change prioritization schemes, or otherwise tamper
with methods to compute payments. Thus, we seek to align
incentives on the sell side as well as the buy side of the
market. Our solution adopts lightweight cryptography and
revenue pooling across sellers, and has the effect of aligning
the interests of sellers with adopting routing policies that
1A side effect is that the scheme does not reduce to fair share
in the case of n identical buyers. Rather, the scheme ran-
domly perturbs each bid before ranking them for the purpose
of determining network prioritization.
maximize total buyer value. This is sufficient for monotonic-
ity of user allocations, which is in turn sufficient for buyer
truthfulness. Revenue pooling makes the market design ap-
pear simultaneously as a first-price market for sellers and a
second-price market for buyers. For sellers, this means they
prefer to maximize the (bid) value of the allocation. For
buyers, this retains the second-price-like bks scheme, and
thus incentive compatibility.
A simulation study confirms that the mechanism achieves
arbitrarily close approximations to full allocative efficiency
for simple demand models (allocating the shared resource
to those who value it the most), shows that reserve prices
can increase efficiency of non-prioritized routing methods,
demonstrates a scenario where sellers have practical efficiency-
improving deviations, and examines the distributional ef-
fects of revenue pooling. We have also prototyped our scheme
using the traffic control module in the Linux kernel.
1.1 Related work
Sen et al. [18] provide an exhaustive survey of the large
literature on smart data pricing. We focus on describing
work related to the specific techniques that we use.
Babaioff et al. [5] and Devanur et al. [6] show that the un-
availability of counterfactuals impedes the design of truthful
mechanisms in the context of multi-armed bandit problems.
We employ the bks scheme in a new application domain.
The effect is that the payment scheme that we adopt ac-
counts for varying user demand, providing an unbiased es-
timate of the cost imposed on other buyers by the prior-
itization associated with a buyer’s device. In contrast, an
earlier scheme due to Varian and Mackie-Mason (VMM) [23]
adopts a myopic, per-packet viewpoint on the cost imposed
on other users and is not incentive compatible when buyers
have adaptive demand patterns. Other approaches from dy-
namic mechanism design are unsuitable, either because they
rely on counterfactual information [10] or rely on a proba-
bilistic demand model [16]. VMM’s work inspired other ap-
proaches, such as the progressive second-price auction [11],
and some follow-on work [12]. As with VMM, they also do
not achieve incentive alignment in dynamic settings.
Godfrey et al. [8] study incentive compatibility of conges-
tion control mechanisms in networks. Our technical analysis
of the separation between bidders is similar to the separation
between flows in this earlier model, but the domain of study
and main results are otherwise incomparable. In a different
domain, Shneidman and Parkes [22] study the problem of
faithful network protocols for BGP routing, where the algo-
rithms adopted by network users must themselves form part
of an equilibrium. In this sense, our revenue pooling scheme
attains faithfulness with respect seller routing algorithms.
Also related is a large literature on the use of crypto-
graphic solutions to provide trustworthy auctions; e.g. [15].
However, these solutions incur too much overhead in the
context of dynamic bandwidth prioritization. Porter and
Shoham [17] provide an analysis of how the presence of
cheating provides a second-price auction with first-price se-
mantics. Our revenue pooling scheme, used for aligning trust
does the opposite: we give a second-price auction first-price
semantics from the perspective of the auctioneer (or seller,
in our model), thereby mitigating incentives for manipula-
tion; the scheme borrows ideas from a random-sampling ap-
proach used in a very different domain, that of the design of
revenue-optimal digital good auctions [9].
Figure 1: Illustration of our model.
2. MODEL
In this section we describe our model, also shown in Fig. 1.
Time and value: Time is modeled in discrete epochs.
Each buyer (agent) i has an allocation period [αi, βi], with
αi ≥ 0 and βi ≥ αi. This is the period of time over which
the buyer associates value with receiving bandwidth. Each
buyer has constant value vi ≥ 0 per byte (a linear valuation),
and bids once before sending data.
Routing: We adopt a flow model of traffic, with a sin-
gle flow modeling both upstream and downstream traffic for
each buyer. The router’s link to the Internet is assumed to
have fixed capacity c > 0. Each buyer has bid bi ≥ 0, and
receives a priority based on this reported value.
We consider three schemes for network prioritization:
1. First-in First-out (fifo) routes data in a first-in, first-
out order as it arrives at the router. Since we do not model
the queue of a router directly, we model fifo as a within-
epoch allocation proportional to within-epoch demand.
2. Fair queueing (fq) allocates bandwidth to all buyers
evenly, dividing any unused capacity recursively: in each
period, each of the n buyers is guaranteed to be able to
consume c/n. Any unused capacity is divided evenly among
buyers with further demand, and this repeats until everyone
is satisfied or capacity is exhausted.
3. Strict Priority Queueing (spq) first allocates capacity
to the buyer with the highest bid in each epoch, up to c or
the demand of the buyer. Then, capacity is allocated to the
buyer with the second highest bid, and so forth, as long as
capacity is available. Ties are broken at random.
Let ci,t denote the network capacity available to buyer i
in epoch t (this depends on her bid, as well as the bid and
network usage of others.)
Transport: We assume that the local network between
router and buyers is much faster than the router’s link to
the Internet and neglect delays there.
Demand: Let xi,t (bytes) denote the cumulative amount
of traffic (upload or download) associated with buyer i up
to and including time t. This may be smaller than the to-
tal capacity available to buyer i up to and including time t
because it depends on the buyer’s demand.
Let Di(t, x) (bytes) denote the demand of buyer i during
epoch t, where x is the cumulative amount of traffic (upload
or download) used so far; i.e., x = xi,t−1. Equivalently, this
represents the maximum amount of network capacity that
buyer i wants to consume during the epoch. Di(t, x) is a
random variable, and we adopt di(t, x) to denote a specific
realization. We consider demand models Di that satisfy the
following condition:
Definition 1. A demand model Di(t, x) is natural if all
realizations di(t, x) satisfy for all t, for all x ≥ x′ and all
c ≥ 0:
x+ min(c, di(t, x)) ≥ x′ + min(c, di(t, x′)).
A demand model is natural when getting more capacity
earlier might increase demand in the future, and should not
decrease future demand below the total amount given lower
capacity. In presenting some examples of demand models
that are natural in this sense, we focus on deterministic ex-
amples. Randomized models can be created through random
perturbations to the parameters of the example, and also
through randomization over the different kinds of models.
Constant demand: A buyer i who simply wants to send
at some constant rate: di(t, x) = k.
Time-varying demand: A buyer i with an arbitrary time-
dependent generation process g(t) that generates data that
must be sent immediately to be useful: di(t, x) = g(t).
Buffered demand: A buyer i with an arbitrary time-dependent
generation process g(t) that generates data, and wants to
send as much of that as possible, buffering demand until it
is allocated: di(t, x) =
∑
p≤t g(p)− x.
Impatient buyer: A buyer i who sends until time p, and
then goes away if some minimum amount of service m has
not been met:
di(t, x) =

k if t ≤ p
k if t > p and x > m
0 else
This can be generalized to multiple thresholds, reduction to
a lower, but non-zero rate, etc.
Increasing demand (in rate) A buyer that has di(t, x) =
g(x/t), with g weakly increasing.
Increasing demand (in total) A buyer that has di(t, x) =
g(x), with g weakly increasing.
This impatient buyer model illustrates that the require-
ment of ”natural” demand functions allow those users to be
modeled whose future value for network access falls if they
don’t receive enough bandwidth.
These demand models capture many realistic types of de-
mand, but some demand functions do not fit our model. In
particular, we do not allow demand to depend on recent us-
age, precluding models like “if I have not been able to use
the network in the last 30 seconds, give up”.
3. PRIORITIZATION AND PAYMENTS
Having introduced the basic elements of our model, we
now describe some variations on payment schemes.
3.1 Fixed price
A baseline comparison is provided by a fixed price pay-
ment scheme. This can be used together with the fifo and
fq routing policies, where only the users who bid above the
fixed price are considered by the prioritization schemes.
3.2 VMM mechanism
The vmm mechanism provides a second comparison point.
This mechanism uses the spq routing policy. For payments,
the original paper by Varian and Mackie-Mason used a per-
packet model, and charged the owner of each forwarded
packet the immediate externality imposed by the packet.
This is the value of the highest value packet that was dropped
while the forwarded packet was in the router’s queue.
Since we do not model the router queue directly, we adapt
the idea behind the payment mechanism to our flow-based
model by charging the immediate externality imposed by
a buyer’s flow in each period, computed using the standard
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (vcg) mechanism, charging V−i−V ∗−i
for each buyer i in each period, where V−i is the total (re-
ported) value to all the other buyers in the (counterfactual)
optimal allocation when i is removed, and V ∗−i is the total
(reported) value to all the other buyers in the real optimal
allocation with i included.
vmm is a natural mechanism, and has inspired a lot of
work on bandwidth pricing. However, the vmm approach is
not incentive compatible in a setting with variable demand.
Consider the following:
Example 1. Suppose that the router link capacity is 1
packet per second, and there is one buyer with value $3 per
packet who wants to send one packet every second and a
second buyer with value $2 per packet who wants to send a
single packet, and keeps trying until she succeeds. Truthful
bidding by buyer 1 will result in the second buyer’s packet be-
ing dropped every period, and a charge of $2 for each packet,
representing the per-epoch externality on buyer 2. On the
other hand, a bid of less than $2 would “flush” the packet
of buyer 2 and then allow buyer 1 to send for the remain-
ing epochs with payment $0. The tradeoff is to reduce the
amount of data forwarded by 1 packet in return for a signif-
icant reduction in total payment.
3.3 The BKS Mechanism
In the example above, vmm over-estimates the external-
ity because it does not have access to the information that
buyer 2 only has a single packet to send. This information is
not available, since we assume that demand models are not
described by users or known by the prioritization scheme.
In this domain, the bks mechanism adopts the spq routing
policy. Payments are determined following a self-sampling
approach, where a randomized perturbation to bids obviates
the need for counterfactual information. The idea is to ob-
tain an estimate of the network resources that a user would
have consumed at some lower bid as a side-effect of the ran-
domization. We adapt the scheme to also allow the seller to
employ a reserve price r ≥ 0, which is the minimal per-byte
price a seller will accept.2 The scheme is parameterized by
µ ∈ (0, 1), which governs the probability of introducing a
random perturbation into bids.
The scheme is most easily explained in terms of an allo-
cation rule A. For us, this encapsulates the combined effect
2To support the reserve price, we use the h-canonical self-
resampling procedure described by bks, with h(z, b) = r +
z(b − r), which has distribution function Fh(a, b) = (a −
r)/(b − r). In Section 3.4, the bks paper claims that Fh =
F0 for all h, where F0 is the distribution function for the
canonical resampling procedure, but F0 doesn’t satisfy their
condition on Fh: h(Fh(a, b), b) = a for all a, b ∈ I, a < b.
Fh(a, b) = (a− r)/(b− r) does satisfy this condition.
of realized demand (including possible strategic effects by
users delaying demand or creating fake demand), the rout-
ing policy, the total capacity constraint on the router, and
user bids. Taken together, these elements define the total
amount of traffic consumed by each user (equivalently, the
realized allocation).
The allocation A(b˜, d) generated by the rule is ex ante
uncertain—it depends on realized demand d = (d1, . . . , dn),
where di denotes the realized demand by i in each epoch, and
is applied to randomly perturbed bids b˜. The bks payment
scheme works as follows:
Definition 2 (bks). Given an allocation rule A and a
parameter µ ∈ (0, 1), the bks procedure in our setting is:
1. Upon arrival, each bidder i submits a bid bi ≥ r.
2. The mechanism computes transformed bids b˜i ∀ i:
(a) With probability 1− µ, b˜i = bi
(b) Else, compute a reduced bid: pick γ ∈ [0, 1] uni-
formly at random, and set b˜i = r+(bi−r)·γ1/(1−µ)
3. For all epochs, the router uses the allocation ruleA(d, b˜)
applied to the transformed bids b˜ of the active users
and given realized demand d = (d1, . . . , dn).
4. Given the amount of network data, xi ≥ 0, associated
with each user i, (as realized by the allocation rule
A applied to transformed bids), collect payment from
user i as:
(a) Collect bixi.
(b) If b˜i < bi, give a rebate Ri =
1
µ
(xi(bi − r)). Oth-
erwise, Ri = 0.
Bids are perturbed, used for prioritized routing, the total
number of bytes associated with a user is observed, and pay-
ments are made through a randomized adjustment via the
rebate in step 4. Each user’s rebate can be determined at
the end of her allocation period, allowing the user’s payment
to be computed while other users are still active.
Definition 3. A mechanism is truthful-in-expectation if
a risk-neutral buyer maximizes expected utility by bidding
truthfully, whatever the bids of others, where the expecta-
tion is taken with respect to random coin flips of the mech-
anism.
Let Ai(b′, d) denote the allocation to buyer i given some
bid vector b′ and demand vector d. (We write b′ to denote a
generic bid vector and avoid confusion with the b submitted
as input to bks.) An allocation rule is ex post monotone
if Ai(b′′, d) ≥ Ai(b′, d), for all bid vectors b′, all demand
vectors d, and all b′′ = (b′1, . . . , b
′′
i , . . . , b
′
n) such that b
′′
i >
b′i. This is ex post in the sense that whatever the bids and
whatever the demand, a buyer’s total traffic consumption
weakly increases with her bid. We use the following result:
Theorem 3.1. Applying the bks procedure with probabil-
ity of perturbation µ to an allocation rule that is ex post
monotone results in a truthful-in-expectation mechanism.
The proof in [4] shows that the scheme obtains an unbi-
ased sample of an integral that defines the payment rule in
the canonical approach of incentive-compatible mechanism
design [13]. The allocation is the same as in the original
allocation rule with probability at least 1 − nµ, where n is
the number of buyers.
Example 2. Let’s revisit the earlier example of manipula-
tion in the vmm scheme. Under bks, when the first buyer’s
bid is not resampled, she pays $3 per packet, and has some
total allocation k. When her bid is resampled, the first buyer
will have allocation k or k−1, depending on whether the re-
sampled bid was below $2. This will result in a large rebate,
and in expectation, the first buyer’s total payment will be
essentially $2, with the exact value depending on µ.
4. BUYER INCENTIVES
To establish truthfulness of the bks mechanism in our
setting we need to show that spq combined with natural
demand models implies that the allocation rule is ex post
monotone. We first show that spq provides an isolation
property on buyers, and then analyze the monotonicity of
our allocation rule.
Lemma 4.1 (isolation). For any t, capacity ci,t under
spq is independent of how capacity is used by buyer i in time
< t, and weakly increases with bid bi.
Proof. Consider n buyers, and order them by bids b1 ≥
b2 ≥ . . . ≥ bn with ties broken at random. Let’s first con-
sider the claim that capacity ci,t in epoch t is independent of
how the capacity is used by buyer i in earlier epochs. Pro-
ceed by strong induction. For buyer 1, then this is immediate
since the buyer always gets to use full the capacity of the
channel. For buyer i > 1, given the induction hypothesis for
buyers < i, buyer i cannot affect demand or allocation to
higher priority buyers and is not affected by the use of the
capacity by lower priority buyers. The result is that buyer i
gets all capacity that is unused by the higher priority buy-
ers. The capacity ci,t is weakly increasing with bid value
because of spq routing. In particular, if buyer i > 1 gets a
higher priority i′ < i then her capacity in period t will be the
capacity unused by all buyers i′′ < i′, whereas previously its
capacity was that unused by all buyers i′′ < i.
Given this lemma, we can now focus on an arbitrary buyer
i, and simplify notation by omitting the subscript i. In par-
ticular, we use dt to denote the realized demand of the buyer
in period t (keeping the dependence on total network capac-
ity used so far silent), and ct to denote the buyer’s realized
capacity. Both dt and ct are realizations of a random pro-
cess (the latter due to its dependence on the demand models
of other buyers.) We first establish monotonicity and truth-
fulness properties of the mechanism under the assumption
that the buyer is greedy in her use of the channel.
Definition 4. Given realized capacity ct and demand dt
in epoch t, a buyer using the greedy policy sends min(ct, dt)
to the router in epoch t.
The greedy policy stipulates that the buyer makes her
demand dt available to the router (up to capacity ct), and
neither pads the demand with fake traffic nor hides demand
by introducing a delay.
Lemma 4.2 (monotonicity). If buyer i’s demand model
is natural, then fixing bids of other buyers and realized de-
mand, buyer i’s allocation up to and including any epoch t
under the greedy policy is ex post monotone in bid value bi.
Proof. The proof uses the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. For any t, when the demand function is nat-
ural, then fixing bid values and realized demand, following
the greedy policy in every period up to and including t maxi-
mizes the total amount of network capacity used by the buyer,
xt, up to and including period t.
Proof. We proceed by induction on t. By fixing bid
values and fixing realized demand we have isolation. The
base case is simple: if t = 1 then using less than min(c1, d1)
for any c1, d1 does not maximize x1.
Consider t > 1. Suppose for contradiction that there is
some natural demand function d and realization of capacity
c such that using min(cp, dp) in every epoch p ≤ t does not
maximize xt. Let f be a sequence of usage amounts that
does maximize xt.
If ft < min(ct, dt), setting ft = min(ct, dt) increases the
allocation in epoch t and thus the total amount consumed,
contradicting the fact that f maximizes xt.
If ft = min(ct, dt), then there exists some p < t such that
fp < min(cp, dp). Let xt−1 be the total amount used up to
and including epoch t − 1 under f . Consider a sequence f ′
of usage amounts that is greedy for all epochs ≤ t, and let
x′t−1 be the total used up to and including t−1 under f ′. By
the induction hypothesis, f ′ maximizes the amount used up
to and including t− 1, so x′t−1 ≥ xt−1. Because the demand
function d is natural,
x′t = x
′
t−1 + d(t, x
′
t−1) ≥ xt−1 + d(t, xt−1) = xt,
so f ′ is indeed a maximizing sequence, establishing a con-
tradiction.
Using this lemma, we obtain Lemma 4.2. Suppose other-
wise. Then it would be the case that following the greedy
policy and using the capacity cp in every epoch p ≤ t leads
to a smaller allocation by epoch t than using the greedy
policy and using the capacity c′p where c
′
p ≤ cp for all p ≤ t
(and ct is the capacity under a higher bid bi > b
′
i, with this
relationship between c′t and ct following from Lemma 4.1).
But this is a contradiction with Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.4. If the buyer is restricted to the greedy pol-
icy then the bks mechanism is truthful and the dominant
strategy is to submit a truthful bid bi = vi.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 4.2 and the prop-
erties of bks in Theorem 3.1.
But we are also want to show that users cannot benefit by
delaying network usage, or padding traffic with fake packets.
Theorem 4.5. The dominant strategy of a user in the
bks mechanism is to bid its true value and follow the greedy
policy.
Proof. We first consider padding with fake traffic in
some epochs. In particular, consider the final epoch t in
which the buyer does this, and for it to matter assume
dt < ct. Fix any bid value bi (perhaps untruthful). We
establish that this weakly increases the buyer’s expected
payment without providing additional value (since it is fake
traffic.) The expected payment in bks is equal (through the
self-sampling approach) to the Myerson payment, and thus
by the Myerson [13] rule, we require
bix
′
i(bi)−
∫ bi
0
wx′i(w)dw ≥ bixi(bi)−
∫ bi
0
wxi(w)dw,
where x′i(w) is the total allocation given bid w with the
padding in epoch t and xi(w) is the total allocation given
bid w without padding in epoch t. This inequality holds
since x′i(bi) − xi(bi) ≥ x′i(w) − xi(w) for all w ≤ bi, since
for lower values the buyer may at some point receive a lower
priority at t and thus be able to send less incremental traffic
through padding, from which we have,
bi(x
′
i(bi)− xi(bi)) ≥
∫ bi
0
w
(
x′i(w)− xi(w)
)
dw.
Second, consider holding back demand in some epochs
such that not all the capacity is utilized. Now that padding
of demand has been precluded, it follows from monotonic-
ity with respect to bid value, and the truthfulness of BKS,
that it is a weakly dominant strategy for a user to bid her
true per-byte value. Moreover, since the expected payment
in BKS is equal to the payments in the Myerson auction,
then vix
∗z∗ ≥ vix′z′ for all alternate allocations x′ ≤ x∗ ob-
tained through demand reduction, where x∗ is the allocation
achieved under the greedy policy, and z∗ and z′ the expected
payment in BKS at allocation x∗ and x′ respectively. From
this, it follows immediately that the buyer cannot benefit by
holding back demand.
On this basis, we conclude that the bks mechanism has
the “truthful in expectation” property in that it supports
both truthful bidding and also straightforward revelation of
demand (and use of the capacity made available through spq
applied to perturbed bids).
5. SELL-SIDE INCENTIVES
We have assumed so far that the seller and router device
can be trusted; e.g., to follow spq and bks pricing. However,
a self-interested seller can do better by deviating from the
scheme as currently described. This is a concern because it
would also lead buy-side incentives to unravel. For example,
consider the following profitable seller manipulations, and
the failure of simple fixes:
(1) The simplest profitable manipulation for sellers is to
simply never give rebates, justifying this by claiming that
the randomized bid resampling in bks just happened to work
out that way. A natural fix to this is to insist that the
seller send the signed bids to a trusted central server for
resampling. The central server would now know whether a
buyer should pay her bid or get a rebate for a particular
allocation, and since the server handles the accounting, it
could appropriately credit or debit the buyer’s account when
it learned the final allocation.
(2) If the seller cannot tamper with the bid resampling
process, it can still manipulate by reducing the allocation
to resampled bidders, since they will be getting rebates and
giving them service will reduce the seller’s revenue. A par-
tial fix to this is to note that to implement spq, the seller
only needs to know the priority order of bidders, and not
their bids, so bids can be encrypted when sent to the cen-
tral server, which would report just the order to the router,
keeping the seller ignorant of the bids.
(3) Unfortunately, the seller can still infer enough from the
order to manipulate, even in a single allocation period. We
omit the math here, but it can be shown that the expected
revenue from the lowest priority user is negative, so the seller
would have an incentive to reduce the user’s allocation.
To preclude such manipulations, we propose a combina-
tion of lightweight cryptographic methods and incentive en-
gineering. In particular, we take advantage of the presence
of multiple sellers in envisioned applications. Precisely, we
need enough sellers that share the same reserve price.
The approach, align-trust, extends the bks scheme de-
scribed so far, using a trusted central server for accounting
and validation, logically inserting it between the buyer and
seller. Buyers pay the center directly, and the center pools
the revenue across sellers in a particular way, making pay-
ments to sellers that address incentive concerns.
We do not assume that the central server can observe
or enforce anything about the sellers’ routing policy. We
merely rely on it to verify the cryptographic signatures on
buyer bids to ensure that sellers cannot tamper with bids,
to keep track of account balances for buyers and sellers, and
to verify that bid perturbation is done correctly. We explain
the approach in the next section.
5.1 The Align-Trust mechanism
One way to think about the problem with seller incentives
in bks is that prioritizing in favor of buyers with resampled
bids has negative value to sellers. (Recall that a bid is only
resampled with some probability µ.) We fix this by first pay-
ing sellers the perturbed bid value for data, rather than the
rebate-adjusted, perturbed bid amount. From the seller’s
perspective, this makes the auction have “first price” seman-
tics, and aligns incentives.
Because the bks mechanism also pays rebates to buy-
ers, just paying the sellers based on perturbed bid amounts
would leave the center with a deficit. Instead, we compen-
sate by taxing the sellers a percentage of their revenue. We
ensure that sellers can only reduce their individual tax rate
by improving efficiency, so sellers maximize revenue by rout-
ing to maximize efficiency (i.e., total value) with respect to
the resampled bids, which we establish is sufficient to retain
incentives on the buy-side of the market.
For the purpose of align-trust, we assume time is di-
vided into accounting periods, perhaps a month long in prac-
tice. These periods encapsulate many bks style auctions, as
various sellers provide bandwidth to buyers.
Recall that bks allows a seller to adopt a reserve price to
increase revenue. To align trust on the sell-side, we insist
that each seller selects a reserve price from a small set of
reserve prices. Based on this, we can now consider the pool
of sellers that select the same reserve price. We apply the
following system-wide payment mechanism for the auctions
involving these sellers:
Definition 5 (align-trust). Consider an accounting
period, and a set of sellers M with the same reserve price.
Let Γ(s) be the set of buyers served by seller s during the
accounting period.
1. Charge each buyer the bks payment bixi−Ri for each
completed auction. Credit each seller s ∈ M the first-
price revenue at the perturbed bids, without including
the rebates:
∑
i∈Γ(s) xib˜i.
2. Randomly split the sellers in M into two disjoint sets
S1, S2 of equal size. Let
C1 =
∑
s∈S1
∑
i∈Γ(s)
xi(b˜i − r)
denote the total credit above reserve price to sellers in
S1. Let
T1 =
∑
s∈S1
∑
i∈Γ(s)
(bi − r)xi −Ri
denote the total above-reserve payments from buyers
associated with S1. Define C2 and T2 similarly for
sellers in S2. Because the payments from buyers in-
clude the bks rebates, and the credits to sellers are at
the first-price resampled bids b˜, this leaves the center
with a deficit δ = C − T for each set.
3. To make up the deficit, the center will tax the sellers.
Define the tax rate for each set as: tax1 =
δ2
C1
, tax2 =
δ1
C2
. Collect tax1C1 from sellers in S1, charging tax rate
tax1 uniformly across all sellers. Collect tax2C2 from
sellers in S2, charging tax rate tax2 uniformly across
all sellers.
This construction has several nice properties. First of all,
as long as sellers continue to use spq it has no effect on
buyer incentives, because align-trust is identical to bks
from the buyer’s point of view. In addition, we have:
Lemma 5.1. The total payment in align-trust is ex-
actly balanced.
Proof. The reserve price payments effectively go directly
from buyers to sellers. The total above-reserve payment to
the system is T1 −C1 + T2 −C2 + tax1C1 + tax2C2 = 0
A tax rate is admissible if it is no greater than one. This
will be true with high probability when no seller accounts
for a large fraction of rebates. This is formalized in the
full version of the paper by characterizing a reasonable (ad-
missibility) condition on supply and using Hoeffding’s in-
equality [21]. We assume this admissibility condition for the
theoretical results that we state in the sequel.
In addition, from a seller’s viewpoint, align-trust trans-
forms the mechanism into a first-price auction (with respect
to perturbed bids) with a tax collected on revenue, where
the seller cannot usefully manipulate his tax rate:
Lemma 5.2. If the tax rate for a seller is weakly less than
one, the seller’s strict preference is to allocate in order to
maximize the total value given perturbed bids.
Proof. Consider a seller s in S1. The tax rate for s is
δ2
C1
. δ2 depends only on sellers in S2, and C1 is the sum of
the revenues of other sellers in S1, which s cannot affect,
and the total revenue for s. Increasing revenue lowers the
tax rate facing s, so as long as the tax rate is less than 1,
this is doubly good for s.3
5.2 Seller Incentives
Under align-trust, seller incentives are aligned with us-
ing a routing policy that maximizes total pre-tax revenue∑
i b˜ixi. This follows from Lemma 5.2. In this section, we
examine the effect that this has on whether sellers want to
follow spq, and on the effect of potential deviations on buy-
side incentives.
First, we characterize situations where sellers cannot profit
by deviating from spq. Second, we look at situations when
3In practice, it would make sense to cap the tax rate at 1,
putting the risk on the center instead of the sellers.
the seller may profit from using a different routing policy,
and show that such deviations improve efficiency with re-
spect to perturbed bids and preserve incentive alignment
with truthful bidding for buyers. The crucial property that
we need to retain under seller deviations is that of mono-
tonicity, or a relaxed form of expected monotonicity.
5.2.1 Demand models where spq is optimal
We first consider cases where the seller’s selfish preference
is to follow spq. The intuition is that deviating results in
an immediate drop in revenue from sending lower priority
traffic ahead of higher priority traffic, so in order for this to
increase revenue, the seller has to expect to make up the lost
revenue later. If this is not possible under a given demand
model then spqis optimal for the seller. In the following, we
consider ex post efficiency, which requires that an allocation
rule maximizes total realized value whatever the bids and
whatever the realized demand. The following lemma follows
from Lemma 5.2, given admissibility.
Lemma 5.3. If spq is ex post efficient (with respect to
perturbed bids), the seller cannot increase his revenue by de-
viating from spq.
We now specialize the natural demand models to under-
stand when spq will be ex post efficient. A sufficient prop-
erty is that the demand model be memoryless, so that it
does not depend on the routing policy, with demand invari-
ant to the total allocation made so far: di(t, x) = di(t, y) for
all x, y and for all realizations of a user’s random demand
model. spq is greedy in regard to bid, and if there is no im-
pact on future demand from a deviation from myopic value
maximization in the current period then spq will maximize
realized value, so applying Lemma 5.3 gives the following:
Theorem 5.4. If the user demand models are memory-
less, then the seller maximizes revenue by using spq, and the
bks mechanism combined with align-trust retains truthfulness-
in-expectation for buyers despite seller self-interest.
5.2.2 Other Demand Models
The seller can benefit by deviating from spq for some
natural demand models. For example, consider the model
of an impatient buyer, as in the example in Section 2. Such a
buyer will stop transmitting if it does not get some minimum
amount of traffic by some time. If the seller knows this, it
can sometimes increase revenue by increasing the buyer’s
priority, increasing her allocation over the minimum, and
ensuring continuing transmission and continuing revenue.
We first consider the extreme case in which the seller can
form a perfect prediction of the future demand and bid val-
ues. Let ∆ denote a set of routing policies considered by
the seller, and let xi(ρ) be the total allocation to i under
routing policy ρ, given the realized demand of all buyers.
Lemma 5.5. If the seller implements the optimal routing
policy in ∆, maximizing
argmax
ρ∈∆
∑
i
b˜ixi(ρ),
with respect to perturbed bids b˜, then the implied allocation
rule is ex post monotone and the resulting mechanism is
truthful-in-expectation for buyers.
The proof is available in the full version of the paper [21].
This illustrates the basic way in which the use of align-
trust aligns incentives for sellers so that they act in a way
that retains buy-side truthfulness.
Rather than ex post monotone, a weaker property of monotone-
in-expectation requires the expected total amount of band-
width used by a buyer to be weakly increasing with bid
value. The expectation is taken with respect to a probabilis-
tic model of demand and bid values and also considering the
random perturbation of bids in bks.
The dominant-strategy equilibrium property for buyers no
longer holds for this seller deviation, because the optimality
of the seller’s policy holds only in expectation, given distri-
butional assumptions about other buyers. In its place, we
adopt the standard notion of Bayes-Nash incentive compat-
ibility, which in our case requires that truthful bidding and
following the greedy policy maximizes a buyer’s expected
utility, given that other buyers do the same.
Theorem 5.6. If the seller implements a routing policy
that is optimal in expectation, solving
argmax
ρ∈∆
∑
i
E
[
b˜ixi,≥t(ρ)
]
,
forward from any time t, where xi,≥t(ρ) is the total addi-
tional allocation (bytes) to i between t and the departure time
of i, given perturbed bids b˜, then the resulting mechanism is
Bayes-Nash incentive compatible.
The proof is available in the full version of the paper [21].
Example 3. An example to illustrate this idea: imagine
a case where the seller knows that a buyer is impatient, with
constant demand 10 in each round for the first 60 rounds,
leaving after that if they do not get a minimum amount m,
drawn uniformly from [300, 450]. There is no uncertainty
about this buyer’s demand, and the seller computes his best
estimates of the other buyers’ future demand. Using these
estimates, the seller can compute the probability that this
buyer will reach each amount between 300 and 450 under
spq routing. Then it can consider switching the routing or-
der in some rounds to increase the buyer’s allocation, and
consider how much that increases the likelihood of the buyer
making it to her (unknown) m and the likely future gains
from that, versus the immediate revenue reduction such a
deviation requires. The intuition for why this is still mono-
tone should be clear— if the buyer’s traffic is worth more,
there is a smaller revenue reduction from increasing her pri-
ority, and a larger potential future payoff, so the seller would
be more likely to increase the buyer’s allocation.
Buyers do not need to know whether the seller is using spq
or an expected-efficiency maximizing policy, since bks re-
mains monotone, and thus incentives are aligned with truth-
ful bidding either way. The buyer only needs to believe that
the seller is not irrationally reducing his expected revenue
by changing priorities away from spq. Another useful prop-
erty is that these results hold for any set of routing policies
∆ considered by the router— as long as the router always
chooses the best policy (in expectation) from a fixed set, we
still get monotonicity, and thus buyer truthfulness.
6. SIMULATION RESULTS
We now present simulations that explore the quantita-
tive difference between mechanisms, and illustrate the effects
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Figure 2: Sample demand realization for 3 buyers with our
trace-inspired model for 600 simulated secs. Each color is a
buyer’s demand.
predicted by our theoretical analysis. We confirm that bks
achieves arbitrarily close approximations to allocative effi-
ciency for simple demand models, show that reserve prices
can increase efficiency of non-prioritized routing methods,
demonstrate a scenario where sellers have practical efficiency-
improving deviations, and examine the distributional effects
of revenue pooling.
6.1 Our simulator
We adopt a custom flow-level simulator, closely matching
our theoretical model. Each epoch is one second, and we
run simulations for 10 minutes, or 600 epochs. Demand
and capacity are specified in KBps. The simulator sup-
ports arbitrary user demand models. We use a stochas-
tic demand model motivated by patterns observed in real
networks, somewhat simplifying the trace-based model de-
scribed in [14]. A user’s demand is composed of flows with
total demand equal to the sum of the demands of the flows
active at any time, flow arrival times are a Poisson process,
flow duration is sampled from a lognormal distribution, and
each flow has Poisson demand.
We use the following parameters: flow durations have both
mean and standard deviation 30 seconds, average flow inter-
arrival times are 30 seconds, and each flow has average rate
of either 10 or 30 KBps, as specified. This results in average
demand equal to the average flow rate.
Fig. 2 shows an example demand trace of three such buy-
ers, each with demand 10 KBps. The pattern is bursty both
at short timescales, reflecting the Poisson demand of each
flow, and at longer timescales, reflecting the random flow
arrival process.
The simulator supports the spq, fq, and fifo routing
policies described in Section 2. Unless otherwise specified,
we simulate vmm with spq routing, bks with spq routing
with priorities based on resampled bids, and fixed price with
fq and fifo routing. The bks resampling frequency µ is 0.2,
chosen as a compromise between reducing the magnitude of
rebates and not sacrificing efficiency. The results are not
very sensitive to the choice of µ. We show the expected
allocation over 1000 allocations for bks.
We simulate truthful bidding for both bks and vmm, even
though vmm is not a truthful mechanism. For memoryless
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Figure 3: Efficiency of routing policies with truthful bidding.
The vmm allocation is optimal in this setting, so the drop to
bks is the efficiency loss due to bid resampling necessary to
obtain truthfulness. spq routing for vmm and bks is much
more efficient than the non-prioritized routing policies.
demand models, this means that vmm results in the optimal
allocation, acting as a benchmark for the truthful mecha-
nisms.
6.2 Efficiency
From our analysis, we know that spq is efficient for mem-
oryless demand models, but may not be efficient for other
demand models. Here, we look at both cases, and look at the
magnitude of this effect in some scenarios. We also examine
the drop in efficiency due to bid resampling in bks.
Fig. 3 shows the social welfare (sum of buyer and seller
utilities) for a scenario with three buyers. The first two
have per-KB values 10 and 4, and average demand 10 KBps
each, simulating a high value and a medium value user. The
last buyer has a per-KB value of only 1, but has a higher
average demand–30 KBps. All buyers use the stochastic
demand model described above, and we compare four dif-
ferent mechanisms–bks and vmm, both with spq routing
and truthful bids, and fq and fifo, with a fixed price of
1. (We study the effect of changing this fixed price in the
next experiment). As the seller capacity increases, the so-
cial welfare increases for all the mechanisms, until all the
demand is satisfied. The demand models in this simulation
are memoryless, so spq routing for vmm is optimal given
that we insist on truthful bidding.
The small difference between the performance of vmm
and bks is the efficiency cost of the sampling necessary for
the truthfulness provided by bks. spq routing for bks is
much more efficient than either of the non-prioritized fixed
price policies. The difference between fq and fifo is also
interesting–with fifo, the allocation is proportional to de-
mand, so the low value, high-demand buyer gets three-fifth
of the channel on average, reducing efficiency.
Fig. 4 shows the effect of reserve price on efficiency, in
the same scenario, with seller capacity fixed at 25 KBps.
Raising the reserve price slightly to avoid allocating to the
lowest value buyer improves efficiency for fifo and fq. Since
vmm and bks naturally prioritize high value data, raising the
reserve price removes opportunities to send low priority data
when there is spare capacity, reducing efficiency.
Reserve price
BKS - SPQ
VMM - SPQ
FIXED - FIFO
FIXED - FQ
Figure 4: Efficiency of routing policies as reserve prices
varies. Seller capacity is 25 KBps. Increasing the reserve
price improves the efficiency of fq and fifo.
Seller capacity (KBps)
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Figure 5: Efficiency for spq and fq when high value buyers
leave early, and a low value buyer is impatient. Deviating
to fq from spq is profitable for a range of seller capacities.
We now look at a case where a seller can profit by devi-
ating from spq. The scenario is similar to the one above:
three buyers, with per-KB values 10, 4, and 1, and average
demands 10, 10, and 30 KBps. However, now the high and
medium value buyers depart after 90 seconds, and the low
value buyer is impatient, leaving after 60 seconds if her allo-
cation is less than 500KB, and otherwise continuing to send
for the full 600 seconds. If the seller fails to allocate at least
500KB to the third buyer in the first minute, she misses out
on forwarding extra traffic later, once the two higher value
bidders are gone. Fig. 5 shows the efficiency of bks with
spq and fq routing. For some intermediate capacities, the
value-ignorant fq routing policy is better, because it results
in the low priority buyer continuing to send. Of course, if the
seller knew the impatience threshold, it could use a better
hybrid strategy, allocating just enough to buyer 3 to ensure
she stays, and then allocating optimally to others.
6.3 Revenue pooling
Next, we study the effects of revenue pooling in align-
trust, first looking at a simplified case where all sellers
Figure 6: Effect of revenue pooling when sellers are similar.
Figure 7: Effect of revenue pooling when sellers are different.
have the same buyer distribution, and then a more complex
case where there are several seller distributions. We confirm
our theoretical results, showing that the center will not have
to run a deficit, and also show that pooling reduces the vari-
ance of seller revenue. Fig. 6 shows the pooled revenue vs
unpooled revenue for 200 sellers from a single distribution,
with seller capacity 40, buyers with per-KB values 2 and 3
and demand 10 KBps, a buyer with value 5 and demand 30
KBps, and no reserve price. In addition to the primary goal
of making bks faithful for sellers, pooling drastically reduces
the variance in seller revenue, with non-trivial pooled rev-
enue for all sellers. This also shows that the tax rate for
both pools is lower than 1, as predicted by the theory.
Fig. 7 shows the pooled revenue vs unpooled revenue for
200 sellers from four different settings: seller capacities 40
or 60, and buyers with total demand 50 or 70, with higher
buyer value when demand is 70. These are indicated by
different markers. Note the dramatic reduction in variance
of pooled seller revenue for each seller category: without
revenue pooling, some sellers have negative revenue while
others have very high revenue. Pooling reduces this variance,
while preserving the relative ordering between seller types–
sellers with higher non-pooled revenue have higher expected
pooled revenue.
7. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Our scheme has three main components: a protocol for
buyers to send bids to the sellers, a priority queueing facil-
ity for sellers to allocate bandwidth to buyer flows accord-
ing to BKS, and a central server for revenue pooling and
accounting. We have prototyped the first two components.
An app on the buyer’s side sends bids (along with duration
of validity of the bid) to a service on the seller device. The
seller device resamples the bids and uses them for allocating
bandwidth, using the standard traffic control (tc) facilities
in the Linux kernel (also used by Android). Specifically,
upon receiving bids or updates to bids, the seller device sets
(tc) filters to classify flows into one of a fixed number of pri-
ority classes based on their resampled bids, which enables
the kernel to enqueue packets in the appropriate priority
queue. Thus, we get efficient strict priority queuing with-
out any kernel modifications, with the caveat that we can
only use a small fixed number of queues. This implies that
we need to round down the resampled bids to the nearest
priority level. However, this modification preserves truthful-
ness since the modified allocation function is still (weakly)
monotone in bids. Payments are made according to the un-
rounded resampled bids.
8. CONCLUSION
We have introduced an approach to prioritized bandwidth
access in a dynamic environment. The method succeeds in
aligning incentives on both the buy-side and the sell-side of
the market for a variety of stochastic demand models. While
auctions can introduce an extra burden on users over charg-
ing a flat fee, they can provide for efficient allocation and
the complexity can be hidden through automated bidding
agents [19,20].
There are many areas for future work. Natural extensions
to the theory include expanding to more expressive demand
models, and considering valuation models other than linear
per byte such as value per rate and multi-dimensional val-
uations. The bks scheme has been extended to handle the
appropriate generalization of monotonicity through a self-
sampling approach [3], and the challenge would be design
dynamic prioritization schemes that satisfy this cyclic mono-
tonicity property for stochastic demand models.
We make several assumptions that are useful in analysis
and developing engineering insights, even if they might not
quite hold in reality. Detailed packet level simulations would
be useful to study situations where our assumptions such as
natural demand models and linear per-byte valuations do
not hold. Analyzing real demand to determine the extent to
which it confirms to our models is also future work. Finally,
developing our dynamic prioritization system prototype fur-
ther by designing appropriate user interfaces for eliciting
buyer values, integrating with applications to allow setting
traffic values, and evaluating performance metrics such as
computational overhead also remains to be done.
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